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Abstract
Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples to show that in the presence of utility
penalties for default, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of
Ponzi schemes and equilibria may fail to exist. This paper aims at providing a coun-
terexample to their claim. We show that in the examples they consider, a competitive
equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on
asset deliveries.
JEL Classification: D52, D91
Keywords: Infinite horizon economies, Default penalties, Collateral, Ponzi schemes,
Pessimistic expectations, No-trade
1. Introduction
In infinite-horizon competitive economies with full commitment, it is well-known that
Ponzi schemes must be ruled out in order to guarantee the existence of equilibria. In an
environment without commitment, Araujo, Pa´scoa and Torres-Mart´ınez (2002) showed
that Ponzi schemes are ruled out (and therefore equilibria always exist) if agents are
forced to hold collateral when they take debt positions. Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) sub-
sequently presented two examples to show that if, in addition to collateral repossession,
agents suffer harsh utility penalties when they default, then Ponzi schemes may reappear
and equilibria fail to exist. This paper aims at showing that the economies considered
in those examples do have an equilibrium with no trade.
The no trade equilibrium outcome is attributed to a simultaneous wedge at autarky
between the asset price and the values of the short and long positions. More precisely,
we show that it is possible to choose the asset price to lie between the value of the
long position evaluated using the most pessimistic expectations about deliveries and
the value of the short position in the presence of harsh default penalties. The loss of
utility when defaulting is so severe that borrowers would fully repay their debts if the
asset were traded. This seems to be inconsistent with lenders’ pessimistic expectations
about deliveries. However, the definition of an (unrefined) equilibrium does not impose
any consistency condition on out of equilibrium paths. In particular, under no trade,
expectations become indeterminate and the inconsistency is formally absent.
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2. The environment
Since our objective is to provide a counterexample to the non-existence results pre-
sented in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009), we consider a specific and simple infinite horizon
economy E without uncertainty, with one short-lived asset, one good per period and time
independent primitives. The set {0, 1, . . . , t, . . .} of time periods is denoted by T .
There exists one non-perishable good available for trade at every period. The depre-
ciation factor is denoted by Y ∈ (0, 1). We interpret xt > 0 as a claim to consumption
at period t and Y xt−1 represents what is obtained at period t if xt−1 units of good are
purchased at period t− 1.
There is a finite set I of infinitely lived agents. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by
an endowment sequence ωi = (ωit)t>0 where ω
i
t > 0 denotes the endowment of the good
available at period t. Each agent chooses a consumption sequence x = (xt)t>0 where
xt > 0. We denote by X the set of consumption sequences. The utility function U i is
assumed to be time-additively separable, i.e., U i(x) =
∑
t>0[βi]
txt where βi ∈ (0, 1) is
the discount factor.
There is a single asset which is a short-lived real security available for trade at each
period t, paying the dividend A > 0 in units of the good. We let q = (qt)t>0 be the
asset price sequence where qt > 0 represents the asset price at period t. For each agent i,
we denote by θit ∈ R+ the purchases and by ϕit ∈ R+ the short-sales of the asset at
each period t. The asset is collateralized in the sense that for every unit of asset sold
at a period t, agents should buy C > 0 units of the good as a collateral that protects
lenders in case of default. We make the assumption that the promise A is strictly larger
than the depreciated collateral Y C, i.e., there exists b > 0 such that A = b+ Y C. At a
period t > 1, agent i should deliver the promise Aϕit−1. However, agent i may decide to
default and choose a delivery ∆it in units of the good. Since the collateral can be seized,
this delivery must satisfy ∆it > Y Cϕit−1 (recall that A > Y C). We denote by σit agent i’s
rate of repayment above the minimal delivery, i.e.,
∆it =
[
σitA+ (1− σit)Y C
]
ϕit−1 if ϕ
i
t−1 > 0.
When ϕit−1 = 0 we arbitrarily pose σ
i
t = 0.
Following Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) assume
that each agent i feels at period t a disutility from defaulting which is represented by
a linear function of the extent of default. More precisely, if agent i decides to deliver
∆it at period t given promises ϕ
i
t−1 made at t− 1, then he suffers at the initial date the
disutility
λit
[
Aϕit−1 −∆it
]+
with λit = [βi]
tµi.
The parameter µi ∈ [0,∞] represents the instantaneous disutility from defaulting one unit
of the good. In that case, agent imay have an incentive to deliver more than the minimum
between his debt and the depreciated collateral, i.e., we may have ∆it > Y Cϕ
i
t−1 or
equivalently, σit > 0. The asset is thought as a pool, i.e., at each period t there is a
delivery rate Kt ∈ [0, 1] that summarizes all different sellers’ deliveries. By purchasing
one unit of the asset, the lenders correctly anticipate to receive the fraction KtA. Recall
that each agent i delivers ∆it =
[
σitA+ (1− σit)Y C
]
ϕit−1 with σ
i
t > 0. In particular, all
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agents rationally anticipate that KtA > Y C implying that there exists an aggregate rate
of repayment σt ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
KtA = Vt(σ) where Vt(σ) ≡ σtA+ (1− σt)Y C.
One of the equilibrium conditions will require that lenders’ expected gross return Vt(σ)
coincides with the actual deliveries of the borrowers in the sense that∑
i∈I
Vt(σ)θit−1 =
∑
i∈I
∆it.
We let A be the space of sequences a = (at)t>0 with at = (xt, θt, ϕt,∆t) ∈ R+ ×
R+ ×R+ ×R+.1 Given a sequence (q, σ) of asset prices and aggregate repayment rates,
we denote by Bi(q, σ) the set of agent i’s choices ai = (xi, θi, ϕi,∆i) ∈ A satisfying the
following constraints:
(a) solvency: xit + ∆
i
t + qtθ
i
t 6 [ωit + Y xit−1] + Vt(σ)θit−1 + qtϕit;
(b) collateral requirement: Cϕit 6 xit and minimum delivery: Y Cϕit−1 6 ∆it.
When choosing a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆) ∈ A, agent i gets the utility U i(x) = ∑t>0[βi]txt
but suffers the disutility W i(a) =
∑
t>1[βi]
tµi [Aϕt−1 −∆t]+. We would like to define
agent i’s payoff Πi(a) as U i(x) − W i(a). Unfortunately, this difference may not be
well-defined if both U i(x) and W i(a) are infinite. We propose to consider the binary
relation i defined on A by
a˜ i a⇐⇒ ∃ε > 0, ∃T ∈ T , ∀t > T, Πi,t(a˜) > Πi,t(a) + ε
where Πi,t(a) = U i,t(x)−W i,t(a) with U i,t(x) = ∑06τ6t[βi]τxτ be the truncated utility,
and W i,t(a) =
∑
16τ6t[βi]
τµi [Aϕτ−1 −∆τ ]+ be the truncated disutility. Observe that
if Πi(a˜) and Πi(a) exist in R then a˜ i a if and only if Πi(a˜) > Πi(a). The set Prefi(a)
of plans strictly preferred to plan a by agent i is defined by Prefi(a) = {a˜ ∈ A : a˜ i a}.
We denote by Ξ the set of sequences of prices and aggregate repayment rates (q, σ)
such that (qt, σt) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] for all t > 0. A competitive equilibrium is a family
of prices and aggregate repayment rates (q, σ) ∈ Ξ and an allocation a = (ai)i∈I with
ai ∈ A such that: for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal among the budget feasible
plans, i.e.,
ai ∈ Bi(q, σ) and Prefi(ai) ∩Bi(q, σ) = ∅; (1)
the good market clears at every period, i.e.,2
∀t > 0,
∑
i∈I
xit =
∑
i∈I
[
ωit + Y x
i
t−1
]
; (2)
1By convention we let a−1 = (x−1, θ−1, ϕ−1,∆−1) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
2By convention xi−1 = 0 and Y−1 = 0.
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the asset market clears at every period, i.e.,
∀t > 0,
∑
i∈I
θit =
∑
i∈I
ϕit; (3)
aggregate borrowers’ deliveries match lenders’ expectations, i.e.,
∀t > 1,
∑
i∈I
Vt(σ)θit−1 =
∑
i∈I
∆it. (4)
For each agent i, we denote by Ωi = (Ωit)t>0 the sequence of accumulated endowments,
defined recursively by Ωit = YtΩ
i
t−1 + ω
i
t with Ω
i
0 = ω
i
0. We assume that accumulated
endowments are uniformly bounded from above, i.e., there exists Ωisup > 0 such that
Ωit 6 Ωisup for every t ∈ T . The sequence
∑
i∈I Ω
i of accumulated aggregate endowments
is denoted by Ω.
3. Indeterminacy of repayment rates and pessimistic expectations
Let (pi, (ai)i∈I) be a competitive equilibrium with prices pi = (q, σ) ∈ Ξ and plans
ai = (xi, θi, ϕi,∆i). Fix a period t > 1. If there is trade in period t − 1, i.e., ϕit−1 > 0
for some agent i, then equation (4) in the definition of a competitive equilibrium can be
restated as follows
σt
∑
i∈I
ϕit−1 =
∑
i∈I
σitϕ
i
t−1
and σt can be interpreted as the average repayment rate (per unit of asset sold) above
the minimum delivery Y C. If there is no trade in period t−1 then the repayment rate σt
is undeterminate. That is, when the asset is not traded, our equilibrium concept makes
no assumption about the expected repayment rate.
We claim that pessimistic expectations about repayments (i.e., low values of σt) may
by itself render the asset market inactive in period t − 1 if default penalties are large
enough. Our finding shares some similarities with the issue of trivial equilibria pointed
out by Dubey et al. (2005). To clarify this link, recall that the delivery rate, denoted by
Kt, is defined by the equation
KtA
∑
i∈I
ϕit−1 =
∑
i∈I
∆it.
As explained in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) (see Remark 3.1), when assets are collateralized
agents deliver at least Y C per unit of asset sold. In this case, rational agents expect Kt
to be greater than the ratio Y C/A, and in particular it must be non-null. This is the
reason why in our presentation of the model we have chosen to parameterize agents’
expectations about delivery by the average repayment rate above the minimum delivery,
denoted by σt. In other words, when there is trade in period t− 1 we have the relation
KtA = σtb+ Y C.
In Dubey et al. (2005) there are no durable goods (say Y = 0) and assets are not
collateralized. In such a framework, it is easy to support equilibria with no trade in the
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asset on account of absurdly pessimistic expectations about delivery rates (i.e., Kt = 0).
However, in a model with collateral requirements, it is not clear whether such equilibria
can be supported since we always have Kt > Y C/A > 0.3 Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009)
claimed that trivial no-trade equilibria do not exist when the securities are collateralized.
The contribution of this paper is to show that although agents expect delivery rates Kt
to be strictly positive (actually above or equal to Y C/A) there is still room for unduly
pessimistic expectations that sustain equilibrium with no trade. To illustrate our point
we consider the two examples presented by Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009) and show that
when default penalties are harsh enough no trade is a possible equilibrium outcome. A
direct implication of our finding is that in those examples harsh default penalties do not
always lead to Ponzi schemes as it is claimed by Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009).
Choose the family (βi)i∈I such that the following inequality holds true
βmaxY C < min{C, βminA} (5)
where βmin = mini∈I βi and βmax = maxi∈I βi.4
Theorem. For every depreciation factor Y small enough and every family (µi)i∈I of
instantaneous default penalties satisfying
∀i ∈ I, µi > 1
1− βiY (6)
the no trade allocation (auti)i∈I with auti = (Ωi, 0, 0, 0) is a competitive equilibrium
under the price and aggregate repayment rates system pi = (qt, σt)t∈T defined by σt = 0
and qt = q where q can be suitably chosen to satisfy
βmaxY C < q < min{C, βminA}. (7)
Remark 1. Observe that σt = 0 corresponds to Kt = Y C/A > 0. That is, under this
price system, no trade is a non-trivial equilibrium according to Definition 3.3 in Pa´scoa
and Seghir (2009).
Our theorem illustrates that even if default penalties are harsh and lenders’ expect
asset deliveries to be strictly positive, pessimistic expectations destroy incentives to trade
3The intuition behind the existence of trivial equilibria in Dubey et al. (2005) is as follows. Consider
the no-trade (autarky) allocation. Introduce next an asset in period t. Choose the delivery rate Kt+1
of the asset equal to zero and the price qt equal to zero. Then no agent would have an incentive to
trade. In a model with collateralized obligations this argument breaks down since Kt+1 must be larger
that Y C/A. One may try to implement no trade by choosing σt+1 = 0 (or equivalently Kt+1 = Y C/A)
and fixing the asset price qt = C. No agent would then have incentives to invest. Indeed, it would be
better to buy C units of the good instead of one unit of the asset because of the utility obtained from
consuming the collateral. However, it is not clear whether agents would have no incentives to sell the
asset. It depends on whether the gain from consuming the collateral in period t can compensate the
future penalty suffered in case of default or the loss in consumption due to the repayment of debt besides
the value of the depreciated collateral.
4It is always possible to find a family (βi)i∈I satisfying (5) since A > Y C and Y < 1. In particular,
one may consider an economy with a single agent. In that case, the above inequality is satisfied for any
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
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and no trade can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. Before providing the rig-
orous arguments to prove the above theorem, we provide some intuition to understand
why the no trade plan (auti) is optimal among budget feasible plans.
Since q > βiY C the asset is too expensive to provide incentives to invest. Indeed,
lenders have pessimistic expectations and believe that the unitary payment of the asset
will be Y C (which corresponds to the minimum delivery associated to the seizure of
collateral). Fix a period t and consider that agent i decides to buy ε > 0 units of the
asset (with ε > 0 small). He has to reduce his current consumption by qε. Since the
good is durable, the agent will also have to reduce his consumption at t+ 1 by Y qε. In
a similar way, his consumption at t+ 2 will have to be reduced by Y 2qε and so on. The
overall impact in terms of utility (at period t) is a decrease of qε(1+βiY +(βiY )2+ . . .) =
qε/(1− βiY ). The purchase of ε units of the asset at period t implies a delivery βiY Cε
at t+ 1. The overall impact in terms of utility (at period t) of this delivery is an increase
of βiY Cε/(1− βiY ) which does not compensate the loss qε/(1− βiY ).
Since q < βiA, the asset price is too low to provide incentives to take a short position.
Indeed, default is prevented since the penalty coefficient µi is higher than the marginal
“overall” utility of consumption 1/(1− βiY ).5 If agent i sells ε > 0 units of the asset at
period t, he will have to repay the full amount Aε at t+ 1. The increase of overall utility
qε/(1 − βiY ) due to the increase of consumption does not compensate the decrease of
overall utility βiAε/(1− βiY ) due to repayment at t+ 1 (and consequently the decrease
of consumption at subsequent periods since the good is durable).
These two conditions (βiY C < q and q < βiA) ensure that the no trade plan (auti) is
optimal among finite horizon allocations. The fact that q < C will enable us to prove that
any budget feasible plan satisfies a transversality condition, which ensures the optimality
of the no trade plan among all budget feasible plans.
Remark 2. The economy described above satisfies all the conditions of the two (classes of)
examples of non-existence proposed by Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009). In their first example,
the unitary default penalty µi is chosen to be large enough, in particular it can be taken
to satisfy (6). In the second example, µi is assumed to satisfy
µi =
f i(#I)
(1− Y )(1− βi)
for some f i > 1. Observe that such default penalties satisfy condition (6) in our theorem.
4. Proof of the theorem
The proof of the theorem is split in three steps: (1) we show optimality of auti
among budget feasible plans with a finite horizon; (2) we prove that auti is optimal
among budget feasible plans with finite utility; and finally (3) we show that any plan
a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆) in the budget set Bi(pi) has a finite utility.
Step 1. We first show that first order conditions are satisfied for some well-chosen
Lagrange multipliers. For any agent i we should find a sequence (δit)t∈T of super-gradients
5Recall that the good is durable.
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of z 7→ [z]+ at 0, i.e., any real number in [0, 1] and a sequence (γit , ρit, χit, αiθ,t, αiϕ,t)t∈T of
non-negative Lagrange multipliers6 such that first order conditions (henceforth foc) are
satisfied:
(a) foc for consumption: [βi]t + γit+1Y + χ
i
t = γ
i
t for every t > 0;
(b) foc for asset purchases: γit+1Y C + α
i
θ,t = γ
i
tq for every t > 0;
(c) foc for deliveries: [βi]tµiδit + ρ
i
t = γ
i
t for every t > 1;
(d) foc for asset sales: γitq + α
i
ϕ,t = ρ
i
t+1Y C + χ
i
tC + β
t+1
i µ
iδit+1A for every t > 1;
(e) binding restrictions at the plan (xi, θi, ϕi,∆i) = (auti): χit[x
i
t − Cϕit] = 0, ρit[∆it −
Y Cϕit−1] = 0, α
i
θ,tθ
i
t = 0, α
i
ϕ,tϕ
i
t = 0 and
γit [Ω
i
t + Y Cθ
i
t−1 + q(ϕ
i
t − θit)−∆it − xit] = 0.
We propose to make the following choices. Since ϕit = 0 we have x
i
t = Ω
i
t > Cϕ
i
t and
therefore the Lagrange multiplier χit associated to the collateral requirement must satisfy
χit = 0. We pose ρ
i
t = 0, δ
i
t = δ
i for some δi ∈ [0, 1] and γit = [βi]tµiδi. We then get the
first order conditions for deliveries. We choose δi such that 1 = µiδi[1 − βiY ]. Since µi
is assumed to be larger than 1/(1− βiY ), we get that δi belongs to [0, 1]. It follows that
first order conditions for consumption are satisfied. We let αiθ,t = [βi]
tµiδi[q − βiY C]
and get the first order condition for asset purchases. We let αiϕ,t = [βi]
tµiδi[βiA − q]
and then get the first order condition for asset sales. Since θit = 0 for every t, first order
conditions ensure optimality among budget feasible plans with a finite horizon.
In the remaining two steps we prove that the no trade plan auti is indeed optimal
among all budget feasible plans. In step (2) it is shown that auti is optimal among budget
feasible plans with finite utility, while in step (3) we show that any plan a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆)
in the budget set Bi(pi) has a finite utility.
Step 2. Consider a budget feasible plan a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆) with U i(x) finite and such
that Πi(a) > Πi(auti). Given a period τ > 0, we let aτ be the “truncated” plan defined
by aτt = at if t 6 τ , aτt = (0, 0, 0, 0) if t > τ + 1 and aτt = (xt − Cϕt, 0, 0,∆t) if
t = τ + 1. Since C > q the plan aτ is budget feasible. Moreover, for τ large enough we
have Πi(aτ ) > Πi(auti) which contradicts optimality among budget feasible plans with
a finite horizon.
Step 3. We propose to conclude the proof by showing that any plan a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆)
in the budget set Bi(pi) has a finite utility. Actually, we will prove that the sequence
(xt)t∈T is uniformly bounded from above. To see this, we let x̂t = xt − Ctϕt > 0. From
the budget constraint at t = 0, we have
x̂0 + qθ0 + (C − q)ϕ0 6 ωi0 6 Ωisup.
6The Lagrange multiplier γit corresponds to the budget constraint, ρ
i
t to the minimum delivery con-
straint, χit to the collateral requirement, α
i
θ,t and α
i
ϕ,t to the non-negative constraints on portfolio
purchases and sales.
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At t = 1, we have
x̂1 + qθ1 + (C − q)ϕ1 6 ωi1 + Y x0 + Y Cθ0 6 Ωisup + Y x0 + Y Cθ0.
Observe that
x0 + Cθ0 = x̂0 + qθ0 + (C − q)ϕ0 + (C − q)θ0 + qϕ0
6 Ωisup + (C − q)
Ωisup
q
+ q
Ωisup
C − q
6 Ωisup
[
C
q
+
q
C − q
]
.
We have thus proved that x̂1 + qθ1 + (C − q)ϕ1 6 Ωisup[1 + ℵ] where
ℵ ≡ Y C
q
+
Y q
C − q =
Y C
q
+
Y
C/q − 1 .
Actually we can prove recursively that
x̂t + qθt + (C − q)ϕt 6 Ωisup
[
1 + ℵ+ ℵ2 + . . .+ ℵt] .
Recall that we propose to choose q satisfying (7), i.e., βmaxY C < q < min{C, βminA}.
Fix Γ > 1/βmax and choose q = q̂(Y ) = ΓβmaxY C. Since βmax < 1 we have Γ > 1
and we automatically get βmaxY C < q̂(Y ). Choosing Y small enough we get the other
inequality q̂(Y ) < min{C, βminA}. Given the choice of q we have
ℵ = 1
Γβmax
+ Γβmax
Y 2
1− ΓβmaxY .
Choosing Y small enough, we get that ℵ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore if a = (x, θ, ϕ,∆) belongs
to the budget set Bi(pi) then the consumption process is uniformly bounded from above.
More precisely we have xt 6 Ωisup/(1− ℵ).
Remark 3. Observe that the above argument is based on a very peculiar property of our
example: there is a uniform lower bound on the “hair cut” C − qt. This is fine since our
aim is to present a counterexample, but it should be stressed that this is far from being
a general feature of models with collateral.
5. Concluding remarks
For the two examples proposed in Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009), we have shown that there
exists a no trade equilibrium due to pessimistic expectations about repayment rates. Our
result raises an interesting issue: the equilibrium concept should be refined in order to
rule out such pathological no trade equilibria.
In a companion working paper (see Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2011)) we show
than we can adapt the refinement procedure introduced by Dubey et al. (2005) to elim-
inate “undesirable” no-trade equilibria. It is then possible to prove that harsh default
penalties preclude existence of “refined” equilibria. In other words, our counter-example
does not change the overall message of Pa´scoa and Seghir (2009), but does show that
their arguments and assumptions are not quite sufficient to prove their claims.
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